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FAIRNESS AND INCENTIVES IN RELATION-BASED SOCIETIES 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper mainly discusses the effects of fairness on incentives in relation-based societies 
(e.g., China) through the principal-agent framework. Our analyses give the conditions under 
which the consideration of fairness will decrease or increase the agent’s efficiency wage. At 
the same time, our analyses give the conditions under which taking into account fairness will 
make the principal’s constraint to incentivize the agent easier or harder to be satisfied. In a 
word, this paper finds that the incentive effects of fairness are condition-dependent, and that 
moral hazard problems are more subtle and difficult to be tackled when fairness is taken into 
account. 
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More and more economists pay attention to the effects of fairness on economic relations. 
However, there are different definitions of fairness. In his original paper, Rabin (1993) 
develops a formal benchmark which incorporates fairness into game theory and economics. 
Rabin’s fairness means that people like to help those who are helping them and hurt those 
who are hurting them. Zajac (1995) holds that “strategic uses of fairness to advance 
self-interest is commonplace,” and that to develop a theory of fairness strategizing needs to 
incorporate two feathers of human behavior. The first feather is that people are not ususally 
energized by a sense of fairness but by a feeling of unfairness. The second feather is that 
“people have a marvelous ability to deny.” Konow (1996) generalizes a conclusion from the 
empiricial research that “fairness is a highly differentiated phenomenon which varies widely 
with context, e.g. social, institutional or cultural context.” Kaplow and Shavell (2002) are of 
the opinion that “notions of fairness typically are used to reach conclusions based upon 
situational characteristics of events.” Alvi (1998) holds that there are three sources of fairness: 
moral precept, convention, and reciprocity. The first source means that “fairness is driven by 
moral prerogatives.” The second source implies that “fairness is a stable convention brought 
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about by an evolutionary process.” The third source signifies that fairness is the result of 
reciprocity. In a word, different people hold dissimilar and even conflicting ideas about 
fairness. In order to unify some concepts in the existent theories of fairness, Corchón and 
Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001) try to propose a procedure based on the aspiration functions, which 
represents an important direction and a potential mathematical framework for the future 
research. 
Although many mathematical tools are used to handle fairness, such as game theory (Rabin, 
1993; Morelli and Sacco, 1997; Cox et al., 2007), bargaining theory (Bereby-Meyer and 
Niederle, 2005; von Siemens, 2009), and incentive theory (Fehr and Schmidt, 2000; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2004; Fehr et al., 2007), there are three very distinct approaches among them. The 
first approach is to regard fairness as a variable of the utility function (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Trautmann, 2009). These seminal works have made a 
great progress in incorporating fairness into formal analyses, although they apply different 
processing methods, which makes it easy for them to make some specific predictions about 
many phenomena. The second approach is to treat fairness as a an extrinsic constraint (e.g., 
Pi, 2007, 2008). This approach argues that fairness is a psychological factor which is 
determined by the cultural background and special situation to a great extent (Kahneman et 
al., 1986; Akerlof and Yellen, 1988; Konow, 1996; Shavell, 2002), and can conduct formal 
mathematical analyses easily by introducing some constraint conditions. The third approach 
is to introduce the psychological cost or painful guilt resulting from unfairness (e.g., Gill and 
Stone, 2010). People can easily understand this approach by intuition. As a whole, our paper 
will adopt the third approach. 
There are two papers which are closely related to our paper. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and 
Fehr et al. (2007) also examine fairness in strategic interactions, and find that fairness 
concerns can affect the provision of incentives through different contracts. There are three 
important distinctions between our paper and theirs. Firstly, their models adopt the first 
approach to some extent, while our model adopts the third approach in the mass. Thus, our 
main variables are fundamentally different from theirs. Secondly, their models are more 
simplified and focuses mainly on the choice of contracts, while our model is more complex 
and focuses mainly on the different equilibrium outcomes without and with fairness. Thirdly, 
our analyses are on the basis of relation-based societies (e.g., China). In relation-based 
societies, relation (or guanxi in Chinese language) is an important factor that should be 
considered. In these kinds of societies, the principal and the agent are thoroughly familiar 
with each other. In other words, the principal has intimate knowledge of the agent, and the 
agent does so, too. This relation or guanxi can ensure that they have common knowledge 
about cost parameters related to unfairness through repeated social interactions. Furthermore, 
the existent literature shows that small group sizes more favor fairness (Höffler, 1999). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the basic setup. Section 3 
provides the model without fairness. Section 4 offers the model with fairness. Section 5 
conducts a comparative analysis of outcomes derived from the two different models. Some 
concluding remarks are made in Section 6. 
 
 
2. THE BASIC SETUP 
 
In this section, we follow Laffont and Martimort’s (2002) analytical framework. There is a 
principal-agent relationship which is subject to moral hazard. It is assumed that the agent is 
risk-neutral. If he exerts effort level , the principal’s added-value will be  with 
probability , and  with probability , where .  and 
 can be seen as success and failure probabilities, respectively. When the agent’s 
performance is good, he can get a bonus; however, when his performance is bad, he will not 
be punished. That is to say, he is protected by limited liability. When he exerts no effort, his 
effort cost is . When he exerts effort, his effort cost is . The subscripts 0 
and 1 represent  and , respectively. For the sake of narrative simplicity, we call 
 the exertion cost. The following mathematical definitions should be noted, , 
, , . 
In order to overcome the moral hazard problem, the principal has to adopt an appropriate 
scheme to incentivize the agent. When the added-value is , the principal offers an 
efficiency wage  to the agent. However, when the added-value is , the principal 
offers an efficiency wage  to the agent. It is assumed that . 
We consider two distinct cases in this paper. The first case is that the principal and the 
agent do not care for fairness. This case is the same as that in the standard incentive theory. 
The second case is that the principal and the agent take fairness into account. This case is 
greatly different from that of the traditional literature. If the agent exerts effort and succeeds, 
both the principal and the agent will take it as fair. However, if the agent exerts effort and 
fails, both the principal and the agent will take it as unfair, which will bring unfairness costs 
 and  to the principal and the agent, respectively. Similarly, if the agent exerts 
no effort and succeeds, both the principal and the agent will take it as unfair, which will bring 
unfairness costs  and  to the principal and the agent, respectively. Unfairness 
related to  and  is called the first-type unfairness, and hence  and  are called 
the first-type unfairness cost to the principal and the agent, respectively. Similarly, unfairness 
related to  and  is called the second-type unfairness, and hence  and  are 
called the second-type unfairness cost to the principal and the agent, respectively. Unfairness 
leads to some kind of disutility cost to the principal and the agent who receive this kind of 
feeling. 
The introduction of , ,  and  is inspired by Gill and Stone (2010), who treat 
the unfairness in an indirect way by introducing some ad hoc cost parameters which are 
different from ours because they deal with a dissimilar issue. Here, the relationship between 
 and  should be noted.  and  reflect the agent’s degree of psychological hatred 
to “reaping where one has not sown” (laoerbuhuo in Chinese language) and “getting 
something for nothing” (bulaoerhuo in Chinese language) in relation-based societies (e.g., 
China), respectively. So, the relation may be that ,  and , which is 
obviously ambiguous. Similarly, the relation between  and  is uncertain, too. 
The timing of the principal-agent game is as follows. 
(1) At t=0, the principal offers an incentive contract  to the agent. 
(2) At t=1, the agent rejects or accepts the offer. 
(3) At t=2, the agent chooses an effort, which is equal to 1 or 0. 
(4) At t=3, the principal’s added-value is realized. 
(5) At t=4, the signed contract is enforced. 
 
3. THE MODEL WITHOUT FAIRNESS 
 
When the principal and the agent do not consider fairness, there is no unfairness cost at all. 
In order to make the agent exert effort, the principal must find an optimal compensation plan 
. The principal’s programming problem will be: 
 
                 (1) 
                                (2) 
                                               (3) 
(1), (2), and (3) are the agent’s incentive compatibility, participation, and limited liability 
constraints when fairness is not considered, respectively. 
According to the standard incentive theory, it is easy for us to find that constraints (1) and 
(3) are binding. 
Solving this programming problem, we obtain: 
                                             (4) 
                                           (5) 
The superscript  stands for second-best state with no consideration of fairness.  
is the agent’s efficiency wage with no consideration of fairness. 
In addition, we need to consider the principal’s constraint to incentivize the agent: 
                 (6) 
It is quite obvious that (6) can be simplified into: 
                                        (7) 
Only when (7) is satisfied does the principal have the incentive to make the agent exert 
effort, otherwise he will prefer not to do it. Therefore, this constraint should be taken 
seriously during the course of our analyses. 
 
4. THE MODEL WITH FAIRNESS 
 
When the principal and the agent do consider fairness, the unfairness costs should not be 
neglected. In this case, the principal’s new programming problem will become: 
 
     (8) 
                          (9) 
                                              (10) 
(8), (9), and (10) are the agent’s incentive compatibility, participation, and limited liability 
constraints when fairness is considered, respectively. 
Two irrelevant constraints have been neglected and omitted. For the sake of analytical 
simplicity, we assume that  or 
, 
which can ensure that the agent’s participation constraint when he exerts no effort (namely, 
) will always be satisfied. That is to say, this constraint is irrelevant. 
According to the standard incentive theory, it is easy for us to find that constraint (10) is 
binding and that constraint (8) is binding when , and that constraint (9) 
is binding when . 
Solving this new programming problem, we obtain: 
If , then 
                                            (11) 
                           (12) 
If , then 
                                            (13) 
                                 (14) 
The superscript  stands for second-best state with the consideration of fairness.  
is the agent’s efficiency wage with the consideration of fairness. 
  If , then the principal’s constraint to incentivize the agent will be: 
  
                               (15) 
  It is quite obvious that (15) can be simplified into: 
       (16) 
If , then the principal’s constraint to incentivize the agent will be: 
  
                               (17) 
It is quite obvious that (17) can be simplified into: 
                     (18) 
  The implications of (16) and (18) are similar to that of (7) which has been stressed in 
Section 3. 
 
5. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we will conduct a comparative analysis between the outcome without the 
consideration of fairness and that with the consideration of fairness. By comparison, it is easy 
for us to obtain the following four propositions. 
Proposition 1: When , if , then taking into account 
fairness will decrease the agent’s efficiency wage; if , then taking into account 
fairness will increase the agent’s efficiency wage. 
Proof: If  and , then from (5) and (12), we obtain: 
. 
      If  and , then from (5) and (12), we obtain: 
.  □ 
Proposition 1 implies that when the exertion cost is large enough and the the first-type 
unfairness cost to the agent is small enough, the consideration of fairness will decrease the 
agent’s efficiency wage, and that when the exertion cost and the the first-type unfairness cost 
to the agent are both large enough, the consideration of fairness will increase the agent’s 
efficiency wage. 
Proposition 2: When , if , then taking into 
account fairness will decrease the agent’s efficiency wage; if , then taking 
into account fairness will increase the agent’s efficiency wage. 
Proof: If  and , then from (5) and (14), we obtain: 
. 
      If  and , then from (5) and (14), we obtain: 
.  □ 
Proposition 2 implies that when the exertion cost is moderate, the consideration of fairness 
will decrease the agent’s efficiency wage, and that when the exertion cost is small enough, 
the consideration of fairness will increase the agent’s efficiency wage. 
Proposition 3: Taking into account fairness will make the principal’s constraint to 
incentivize the agent easier to be satisfied when  and 
 or when  and 
. 
Proof: When  and , then from 
(7) and (16), we obtain: 
       
 
. 
     When  and , then from (7) and 
(18), we obtain: 
       
.   □ 
Proposition 3 implies that when the exertion cost and and the first-type unfairness cost to 
the agent are both large enough, the principal is more likely to incentivize the agent, and that 
when the exertion cost is small enough, the principal is more likely to incentivize the agent. 
Proposition 4: Taking into account fairness will make the principal’s constraint to 
incentivize the agent harder to be satisfied when  and 
 or when  and 
. 
Proof: When  and , then from 
(7) and (16), we obtain: 
       
 
. 
     When  and , then from (7) and 
(18), we obtain: 
       
.   □ 
Proposition 4 implies that when the exertion cost is large enough and the the first-type 
unfairness cost to the agent is small enough, the principal is more unlikely to incentivize the 
agent, and that when the exertion cost is moderate, the principal is more unlikely to 
incentivize the agent. 
There is a extreme case that should be stressed and discussed. The case is that there don’t 
exist the second-type unfairness costs at all. That is to say . This special case can 
act as a benchmark that sets a starting point for our analyses. According to Propositions 1-4, 
we can find that in this case: (a)  (namely, ) and 
 (namely, ), and (b)  (namely, ) and 
 (namely, ) . (a) and (b) imply that taking 
into account fairness will increase the agent’s efficiency wage and make the principal’s 
constraint to incentivize the agent easier to be satisfied.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, we mainly discuss the effects of fairness on incentives in relation-based 
societies (e.g., China) through the improved principal-agent framework. Our analyses show 
that under some conditions the consideration of fairness will decrease the agent’s efficiency 
wage, while under other conditions the consideration of fairness will increase the agent’s 
efficiency wage. At the same time, our analyses show that under some conditions taking into 
account fairness will make the principal’s constraint to incentivize the agent easier to be 
satisfied, while under other conditions taking into account fairness will make the principal’s 
constraint to incentivize the agent harder to be satisfied. In summary, fairness concerns play 
an important role in economic relations in relation-based societies, and moral hazard 
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Rad uglavnom razmatra učinke pravednosti na poticaje u društvima zasnovanima na 
rodbinskim vezama (npr. Kina) u okviru odnosa principala i agenta. Naše analize 
prezentiraju uvjete pod kojima će razmatranje pravednosti smanjiti ili povećati agentovu 
stimulativnu nadnicu. Istovremeno, istraživanje prezentira uvjete pod kojima će uzimanje 
pravednosti u obzir otežati ili olakšati zadovoljavanje principalovih ograničenja pri 
poticanju agenta. Jednom rječju, ovaj rad pokazuje da poticajni učinci pravednosti ovise o 
okolnostima a da moralni problemi postaju istančaniji i teže rješivi kad se pravednost uzme u 
obzir. 
 
Ključne riječi: pravednost, poticaj, principal-agent, stimulativna nadnica 
 
